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ABSTRACT 
POLITICAL  INSTABILITY  AND 
ECONOMIC  GROWTH 
This paper investigates the relationship  between political  instability  and 
per capita  GDP  growth  in a sample of  113 countries  for  the period  1950-1982. 
We define  “political  instability”  as the propensity  of a government  collapse, and 
we  estimate  a model  in  which  political  instability  and  economic  growth  are 
jointly  determined.  The main  result  of  this paper is that in countries  and time 
periods  with  a high  propensity  of government  collapse,  growth  is significantly 
lower  than  otherwise.  This  effect  remains  strong  when  we  restrict  our 
definition  of  “government  change”  to cases of  substantial  changes of  the 
government. 
Albert0  Alesina 
Department  of  Economics 
Harvard  University 
Cambridge,  MA  02138 
and NBER 
Sule Ozler 
National  Fellows  Program 
Hoover  Institution 
Room  203L 
Stanford  University 
Stanford,  CA  94305 
and NBER 
Nouriel  Roubini 
Department  of  Economics 
Yale  University 
P.O. Box  1972 - Yale  Station 
New  Haven,  CT  06520 
and NBER 
Phillip  Swagel 
Federal  Reserve Board 
20th  Street and 
Constitution  Ave,  NW 
Washington,  D.C.  2055 1 1.  Introduction 
Economic  growth  and  political  stability  are  deeply 
interconnected.  On  the one  hand,  the uncertainty  associated with  an 
unstable  political  environment  may reduce investment  and the speed of 
economic  development.  On  the  other  hand,  poor  economic 
performance  may  lead  to  government  collapse  and  political  unrest. 
This  paper  studies  the  joint  determination  of  the  propensity  of 
government  changes  (our  measure  of  “political  instability”)  and 
economic  growth  in  a sample  of  113  countries  for  the period  1950- 
1982. 
The  primary  result  of this  paper  is  that in  countries  and time 
periods  with  a high  propensity  of  government  collapses,  growth  is 
significantly  lower  than otherwise.  This  effect is strong for  both of the 
two  types of government  changes considered:  all  government  turnovers 
including  those that do  not involve  a significant  change in  ideological 
direction  or  an  “irregular”  transfer  of  power  or  alternatively  those 
government  turnovers  that involve  only  these two  types of  changes. 
Our  other  results  are:  1)  Contemporaneous  low  economic 
growth  is  not  found  to  increase  the  contemporaneous  propensity  of 
government  changes.  2) We do  not find  any evidence  that economic 
growth  is  significantly  different  when  authoritarian  regimes  are 
compared to democracies.  3) We find  that political  instability  tends to 
be persistent,  in  that the occurrence of frequent  government  collapses 
increases the probability  of  additional  collapses. 
This  is  not  the  first  paper  which  studies  the  relationship 
between  economic outcomes  and political  instability  in  a large  sample 
1 of  countries.  *  Notably, Barro  (1991) finds that measures  of political 
unrest, such as number of assassinations  and the occurrence of violent 
revolutions and military  coups significantly  affect the average  growth 
level in cross section regressions  on a large sample of  countries.  In 
addition, Kormendi  and McGuire (1985) and Barro (1989) find that a 
measure of the extent of political  rights is positively  correlated with 
growth. 
Other  studies  which  have  adopted  a  notion  of  political 
instability  similar to ours have found effects of instability on inflation 
(Cukierman, Edwards  and Tabellini (1992)), and on external borrowing 
(&ler  and Tabellini  (199  1)).  In  these papers, a measure of political 
instability is added  as a regressor in cross section or panel regressions; 
however,  this  methodology  does not  take  into  account the  joint 
endogeneity  between the economy and the polity. 
Londregan  and  Poole  (1990,  1991a) have  addressed this 
problem  of joint  endogeneity by  estimating a system of  equations in 
which  the dependent variables are GNP  growth  and coups d’etat.2 
Their results are different from  ours, in particular in that they do not 
find evidence  of reduced  growth as a consecuence  of increased  political 
instability.  Our study differs from  theirs in several  important respects. 
First,  in model specification.  In  our growth equation we control for 
several economic determinants of growth,  as identified by the recent 
empirical literature on economic growth,  as  well as some indicators of 
political unrest in the government change  equation.  In addition, we do 
not primarily  focus on  “coups d’etat”  but on a broader definition  of 
government  changes,  which  includes  not  only  coups  but  also 
2 constitutional  transfers  of power:  political  uncertainty  is not confined 
to the occurrence of military  coups.  We present some results based on 
our  specification  focusing  only  on  coup  detat  so  as  to  suggest  the 
sources of differences  in the results  of these two  sets of  works. 
This  paper  is  organized  as follows.  Section  2  discusses the 
basic questions which  we  explore  in  our empirical  analysis.  Section 3 
presents  the  econometric  methodology  used  both  for  the  by  now 
familiar  in the cross-sectional methodology  and for the joint  estimation 
of  the  growth  and government  instability  equations  using  panel  data. 
Section  4  describes  our  data  set, highlights  some basic  statistics  and 
describes  the  specification  used  in  the  estimation  of  the  cross-section 
and  panel  models.  In  Section  5  we  present  our  cross-section 
regressions of growth.  The  main results  of the panel  estimation  of our 
simultaneous  equation  system  are discussed  in  Section  6.  Section  7 
presents alternative  specifications  so as to investigate  the robustness of 
our  results.  The  last  section  is  a  discussion  of  future  avenues  of 
research. 
2.  Does  political  instability  affect  economic  growth? 
The  first  step toward  answering  this  question  is a definition  of 
what  it  is  meant  by  “political  instability”.  In  this  paper,  “political 
instability”  is  defined  as the  propensity  of  a change in  the  executive, 
either by “constitutional”  or  “unconstitutional”  means.  Thus,  we study 
whether  a high  propensity  of an executive  collapse  leads to a reduction 
of  growth. 
3 One strong  theoretical  argument underlying  this  relationship  is 
based upon the effects of uncertainty on productive  economic decisions, 
such investment,  production  or labor  supply?  A  high  propensity  of a 
change  of  government  is  associated  with  uncertainty  about  the  new 
policies  of  a potential  new  government;  risk-averse  economic  agents 
may hesitate to take  economic initiatives  or  may  “exit”  the economy, 
by  investing  abroad.  Conversely,  foreign  investors  prefer  a  stable 
political  environment,  with  less policy  uncertainty  and less uncertainty 
about property  rights4 
Alesina  and  Tabellini  (1990),  Tabellini  and  Alesina  (1990), 
Cukierman,  Edwards  and Tabellini  (1992),  6zler  and Tabellini  (1991) 
present  several  models  in  which  a government  is uncertain  about its 
survival,  and  as  a result  engages in  suboptimal  policies  in  order  to 
“worsen”  the state of the world  inherited  by  its successor.’  All  these 
models  have  in  common  the  idea  that  political  instability  lead  to 
economic inefficiencies. 6  The  most direct application  of this  idea for 
economic growth  is  in  Alesina  and Tabellini  (1989),  which  examines 
the effect of political  uncertainty  on investment  and capital  flight.  The 
possibility  of a government  collapse  leading  to a new  government  prone 
to  tax  capital  and  productive  activities  implies  a  substitution  of 
productive  domestic  investments  in  favor  of  consumption  and  capital 
flight,  and thereby leads to  a reduction  of domestic production. 
A  different  argument  leading  to  a  similar  relation  between 
political  instability  and  growth  is  implied  by  Grossman’s  (1991) 
analysis  of revolutions.  In  countries where  rulers  are relatively  weak, 
i.e. more easily overthrown,  the probability  of revolutions  is higher and 
4 the citizens have  higher  incentives  to  engage in revolutionary  activities 
rather  than  productive  market  activities.  On  the  contrary,  a  strong 
ruler  who  makes  a  revolution  unlikely  to  succeed  discourages 
revolutionary  activities  in  favor  of market  activities. 
A  related  line  of  research, in  particular  the work  by Murphy, 
Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1991)  and  Terrones  (1990),  emphasizes  the 
negative  effects of rent-seeking  activities  on economic growth.  A weak 
government  constantly under threat of losing  office  may be particularly 
sensitive  to  the  need of  pleasing  lobbyists  and pressure  groups,  thus 
leading  to  a  more  direct  effect  of  rent-seeking  activities  on  policy 
decisions. 
Two  objections  to these arguments are worth  mentioning.  The 
first  one  is  that  a high  propensity  of  a government  change may  be 
viewed  favorably  by  economic  agents  if  the  current  government  is 
incompetent and/or corrupt and its possible  successors are viewed  as an 
improvement.  In  a  large  sample  such  as ours,  it  is  reasonable  to 
assume  that  the  expected  value  of  the  competence  of  future 
governments  is not higher  than the current government  competence. 
Second,  if  the  propensity  of  government  change is  large,  an 
increase of it may actually reduce political  uncertainty,  since it becomes 
more  certain  that the  current  government  will  collapse.  However,  if 
the  characteristics,  or  even  the  identity  of  the  successor  of  the 
incumbent government  are not known  with  certainty, an increase of the 
propensity  of  a  political  change  may  lead  to  an  increase  in  policy 
uncertainty.  In  fact,  it  implies  an  increase  of  the  propensity  of substituting  a  well  known  (even  though,  possibly,  inefficient) 
government for a less known one. 
A  study of  the  effects of  political  instability  on  economic 
growth needs  to deal with the problem of joint  endogeneity: even if it 
is true that a high propensity of having frequent government changes 
reduces  growth, it may also be the case  that low growth increases  the 
probability  of  a  government  change.  The  effect  of  growth  on 
government changes  is likely to be observable  in both democracies  and 
in  dictatorships.  In  democracies, a  vast  empirical  literature’  has 
established that  high  growth  in  preelection  years  increases the 
likelihood of  reelection of the incumbent government:  voters do not 
reelect incumbents  if they perceive that the latter have mismanaged  the 
economy.  Specifically,  voters appear to pay particular  attention to 
income growth immediately before elections.  In non-democracies  the 
likelihood of coups  d’etat may also decrease  with both the level of GDP 
per capita and its rate of growth.  Low  growth may increase popular 
dissatisfaction  and  create  incentives  for anti-government  political action. 
These  are, in fact, the  results shown by Londregan and Poole (1990), 
(199  la)  in  their  studies  of  the  economic  determinants  of 
unconstitutional transfers of power. 
A  related issue is whether democratic institutions are harmful 
or conducive to growth.  A  rather popular argument is that democratic 
institutions may be harmful to growth8  The basic idea underlying this 
view is that policy makers in democratic government are subject to the 
pressures  of  interests  groups,  and  thus  short-sightedly  follow 
opportunistic policies to enhance  their chances  of reelection instead of 
6 policies  that  enhance long  term  growth.  However,  these arguments 
against democracy are not necessarily conclusive.  First of all,  dictators 
may  also  need  to  be  opportunistic  if  their  survival  in  office  is 
threatened.  Second, authoritarian  regimes  are not a homogenous  lot: 
they  include  “technocratic”  dictators  and  “kleptocratic”  ones.  While 
the  apparent association  of  high  economic  growth  with  authoritarian 
regimes  is  suggested  by  the  experience  of  several  authoritarian 
“technocratic”  regimes  (such  as those  in  Korea,  Taiwan,  Indonesia, 
Turkey,  Chile)  it is as well  evident  that for each “benevolent”  dictator 
one  can  observe  at  least  as  many  “kleptocratic”  and/or  inept 
authoritarian  regimes  whose  rule  has  led  to  systematic  economic 
mismanagement  and eventual  political  and economic collapse  of  their 
countries.’  One  can therefore  conclude  that,  both  on  theoretical  and 
empirical  grounds, there is no obvious  relationship  between democracy 
and growth. 
In  fact,  the  empirical  cross-country  evidence  on  the  relation 
between  democracy  and  growth  is  quite  mixed.  Some early  studies 
argue  that  democratic  regime  tend  to  slow  economic  growth  while 
authoritarian  regimes  tend  to  stimulate  it.”  However,  others  show 
that there  is no  systematic relation  between  long  term  growth  and the 
democratic/  authoritarian  nature of the political  regime.”  Alesina  and 
Rodrik  (1991)  present  a  model  which  is  consistent  with  this 
inconclusive  evidence.  In their model,  democracies should  grow  faster 
than  “populists”  or “kleptocratic”  dictatorships,  but less fast than “right 
wing”  or  “technocratic”  dictatorships. 3.  Methodology 
This  section  describes the  procedures  employed  for  the 
estimation.  First,  we  give  a  brief  discussion of  single  equation 
estimation, where cross  section  growth regressions  are considered. The 
primary purpose of employing this method is to facilitate a comparison 
of  our  results with  those of  other cross section studies in the recent 
literature such as those of Barro (1990, 1991).  A  major drawback of 
a single equation approach for  our study is that it does not take into 
account the joint  endogeneity  of the growth and government change. 
Hence, later in this section, we turn to a discussion  of a simultaneous 
equation methodology,  which  constitutes the primary  focus of  this 
study. 
3.1.  Single Equation Method 
3.1 .a.  Political Instability 
Political  instability,  defined as the propensity of  an imminent 
government change, is not directly  observable.  Since “government 
change” is  a  discrete phenomenon, we  employ  limited  dependent 
variable  estimation methods.  Propensity of  government change is 
characterized as a function of  economic and political  variables.  We 
estimate the  probit  specification described below  using  time-series 
cross-section  pooled data (for notational convenience  time and country 
indicators are omitted): 
where: 
8 CL  =  a latent variable such that when c* >  0 we observe the 
occurrence of  a government change, and we do not observe 
government change  otherwise. 
x1  =  variables (economic and political)  that determine the 
occurrence of government change. 
q  =  normally distributed error term with mean zero. 
This specification facilitates an estimation of  probabilities of 
government change that varies over time  and across countries.  We 
then average these annual measures of  probability  for  each country 
over time so as to obtain a cross section measure  of instability,  which 
we call INS,  to use in the cross section growth regressions  described 
next. 
3.1 .b.  Economic Growth 
A  cross section estimation of  growth  is  described with  the 
following  specification: 
Y  =  AX,  +  B(INS) +  E  (2) 
where: 
Y=  average  economic growth in each  country for the sample 
period. 
x,  =  economic variables that explain economic growth, 
INS  =  measure  of political  instability, obtained from  equation 
(1) as the average  estimated  probability of government change 
over the sample for  each country. 
&=  error term with mean zero. 
This approach  has two  problems.  First,  as instability  is a generated  regressor, the standard errors of the second stage equation 
are generally  inconsistent.  l2  A  more  serious problem  is  that  of 
simultaneity.  Since  the propensity of government change  and economic 
performance are endogenous,  equations (1) and (2) are both likely  to 
be biased. We address  this issue  by using a simultaneous  estimation of 
the two equations  for growth and political  instability as described  next, 
3.2  A  Simultaneous  Equations Approach 
Let us define the following  structural equation system, where 
the dependent  variables  of government change  and growth are as  before 
(but now both with yearly frequency): 
c*  = 
~CXC  +  rscx  +  YCY  +  Ul 
(3) 
Y =  TX,  +  pyx  +  “vyc*  +  u2 
where: 
Y =  annual rate of growth, 
X  =  exogenous variables that determine both government 
change  and growth, 
x,  =  exogenous variables  (economic  and  political)  that 
determine the  occurrence of  government  change only  (i.e 
instruments for  instability), 
xy  =  exogenous variables that determine economic growth 
only (i.e. instruments for growth), 
49  u2  =  error  terms are assumed to  be bivariate  normally 
distributed with zero mean and variance covariance  matrix  that 
allows for cross-equation  correlations. 
The  coefficients  7C  and  rY  take  into  account  the 
contemporaneous  feedback  between  growth and  changes  of government, 
10 while  the  ar and  6  coefficients  measure  the  effects  of  the  exogenous 
variables.  One way of identifying  the system requires  that at least one 
each of  the &  and X,, variables  exist;  that is, we  need one exogenous 
variable  in  the  growth  equation  which  is  not  in  the  equation  for 
government  change, and vice-versa.  An  alternative  way of identifying 
the  system  of  equations  is  to  impose  restrictions  on  the 
contemporaneous  feedback,  i.e.  yC=O or  yy  =O.  In  order  to  test the 
model  (a  chi-square  test),  there  must  at least be  one  overidentifying 
restriction,  in  addition  to the restrictions  needed to  identify  the model 
fully.  We  discuss  the  economic  and  political  variables  used  as our 
identifying  restrictions  in Section 4. 
This  model,  a simultaneous  equation  system involving  a latent 
variable,  is described  in Heckman  (1978).  While  this  system could  in 
principle  be  estimated by  standard  maximum  likelihood  methods,  the 
resulting  likelihood  function  is extremely  non-linear  and thus difficult 
to  maximize  using  standard methods.  Londregan  and Poole  (1990) use 
the results  of  Newey  (1987) to  estimate this type of system through  an 
application  of  Amemiya’s  Generalized  Least  Squares  Technique 
(AGLS).  Since  we  employ  the  same  econometric  methodology  the 
technical  details are not replicated here (see the Appendix  of Londregan 
and Poole  (1990)).  Instead, we provide  only  a heuristic  description  of 
the estimation  procedure. 
The  estimation  proceeds in  two  stages:  estimation  of reduced 
forms  of  both  equations,  and  then  extraction  of  the  structural 
parameters  from  the  reduced  forms.  The  likelihood  function  of  the 
system  factors  out  into  the  product  of  the  likelihood  function 
11 corresponding  to the growth equation  and the likelihood function of the 
p&it  that  corresponds to  the  government  change equation.  This 
greatly  simplifies estimation of the reduced form,  since the equations 
can be estimated sequentially. The growth  equation is estimated as a 
function  of all the exogenous  variables in the system using OLS.  The 
residuals  from  this regression  are then added  as a regressor, in addition 
to all the exogenous  variables in the system, for  the reduced form  of 
the probit estimation for  government change.  After  adjusting to take 
into account  correlation across  the equations,  the resulting coefficients 
are the maximum  likelihood estimators  of the reduced  form parameters. 
The reduced  forms take into account  that there may be shocks  common 
to both growth and instability. 
The  structural  form  estimates  take  into  account  the 
simultaneous  feedback  between  growth and government change. Fully 
efficient structural estimates are obtained by  a GLS regression of the 
stacked coefficients from  the two  reduced form  equations against the 
two  “contemporaneous”  (y) parameters  and a “selection” matrix  which 
picks out the appropriate reduced form  coefftcients.  A  bootstrapped 
estimate  of  the  variance-covariance matrix  of  the  reduced  form 
coefficients (Efron (1982)) is used  to form  the weighting matrix  for the 
GLS  regression.  We  use 1024 bootstrap replications  (so that  the 
number of replications we have are identical to Londregan and Poole 
(1990)). 
12 4.  Data  and  Specification 
This  section briefly  describes our  data and the specification  of 
our  equations  for political  instability  and for growth.  Our panel  data 
set includes  a time  series and  cross section panel  for  113 countries.13 
For  about half  of the countries  the sample period  is  1950-82,  for  most 
of  the  others  the  sample  is  196042.  A  list  of  countries  and  sample 
period  is in Table  A. 1, in the Appendix. 
4.1  The  Specification  of the Political  Instability  Equation 
Our specification  for the government  change is similar  to those 
employed  in the  recent literature  (Cukierman  et al.  (1992),  ozler  and 
Tabellini  (1991)).  The  independent variables  can be classified  in three 
broad  classes:  1)  indicators  of  political  unrest  such  as  cabinet 
adjustments;  2)  “structural”  institutional  variables  which  account  for 
differences  across countries  such as the  GDP  per  capita  and being  a 
democracy  or  not;  3)  economic  performance  in  the  recent  past,  in 
particular  the  recent  growth  level.  A  complete  list,  along  with 
definitions  and sources of  each variable  is provided  in  Table  A-2. 
A  significant  innovation  in our  data concerns the definition  of 
the  dependent  variable  for  government  change.  We  employ  two 
different  dependent variables.  The  first  one  (GCHANGE)  is the  one 
used  in previous  studies and obtained  from  Jodice and Taylor  (1983). 
This  variable  codes as one any regular  or irregular  (i.e.,  coup) transfer 
of  executive  power.14 
In  an  attempt  to  eliminate  from  our  dependent  variable 
government  changes  which  do  not  involve  a  substantial  turnover  of 
13 leadership,  we  have  constructed  a  variable  for  major  changes 
(MJCHANGE).  This  includes:  i) all  “irregular”  transfers  of  power; 
ii)  a subset of  “regular”  transfers  which  imply  a change in  the  party, 
or  coalition  of  parties  in  office.  This  change  in  the  definition 
substantially  reduces  the  number  of  “changes”  in  our  dependent 
variable.  The sample  characteristics of our data are displayed  in Table 
1. 
A  second innovation  in our data set is our own  construction  of 
a variable  for democratic institutions,  DEMOC.  This  variable  takes the 
value  of one for  countries with  free  competitive  general  elections  with 
more  than  one  party  running;  two  for  countries  with  some  form  of 
elections but  with  severe limits  in the competitiveness  of such ballots; 
three  for  countries  in  which  their leaders  are not elected.15 
4.2  The  Specification  of the Growth  Equation 
The variables  employed  are described in Table  A.2,  separately 
for the cross-section data used in the single  equation estimation,  and the 
panel  data used  in  the  simultaneous  equation  estimation  (differences 
between  the two  primarily  arise from  data availability). 
Our  specification  draws  heavily  upon  the  recent  growth 
literature.  We  include  variables  which  proxy  for  the level  of  income 
and the level  of  human  capital,  as well  as regional  dummy  variables. 
In  the  time  series  cross section  specification  we  also  control  for  the 
world  business  cycle  by  adding  the  weighted  average  of  the  lagged 
growth  rate of the seven largest industrial  economies and we control  for 
“persistence”  in  growth  by using  the lagged  dependent variable. 
14 In  the  joint  estimation  we  use  both  economic  and  political 
variables  to  identify  the growth  and government  change equations.  In 
our  base  specification,  the  growth  equation  is  identified  by  the 
enrollment  ratio  in  primary  school  (EDUC).  The  government  change 
equation  is identified  by the lagged  dependent variable  and by a dummy 
variable  that  indicates  the  occurrence  of  an  executive  adjustment 
(EXADJ),  lagged  one  period.  These  three  identifying  assumptions 
imply  one overidentifying  restriction  which  can be tested.  The test has 
a  chi  squared  distribution  with  one  degree of  freedom;  it  essentially 
tests the difference  between  the reduced and structural  form.  A  small 
value  for  the  test  statistic  corresponds  to  a  high  p-value,  which 
indicates  the significance  level  of not  rejecting  the model. 
5.  Results  of  the  Single  Equation  Approach 
This  section  presents  cross-sectional  results  which  extend 
previous  work  by Barro  (1989,  1991),  Scully  (1988),  and Kormendi 
and  Mcguire  (1985).  The  joint  endogeneity  issue is addressed  in  the 
next  section, where  we  estimate a simultaneous  system; here,  we  first 
derive  a  measure  of  political  instability  and  use  it  in  cross-section 
growth  regressions.  As  specified  in  (1) and (2) above,  our procedure 
for  constructing  a measure of the probability  of government  change is 
to  estimate a probit  model  of total  government  change on pooled  time 
series and cross-country data.  We then use the fitted  values  from  this 
probit  regression  to  derive  the  average  predicted  probability  of  a 
government  change  over  the  sample  period  for  each country.  The 
results  of  these  probit  regressions  are presented  in  Table  A.3  in  the 
15 Appendix.  l6  The  next  step  is to  introduce  our  estimated  measure  of 
political  instability  from  the  probit  regression  in  standard  cross- 
sectional  regressions  of the determinants  of  economic growth. 
Before presenting these results, we show  in column  (1) of Table 
2 a replication  of Barro’s  regression  for the average per  capita growth 
rate of  the  98  countries  in  the  sample  in  the  1960-1985  period  (for  a 
list  of  countries  see Table  A-l).  The  results  of  this  regression  are 
familiar.  Initial  per capita income  (GDP60)  has a significant  negative 
sign,  confirming  the  hypothesis  of  conditional  convergence;  high 
economic growth  is associated with  high  initial  level  of human  capital 
(PRIM60  and  SEC60);  non-productive  government  spending  (GOV) 
and  distortions  in  the  pricing  of  capital  goods  (PPSODEV)  lead  to 
lower  economic  growth;  and  the  two  regional  dummies  for  Latin 
America  and Africa  are significant  with  a negative  sign.  Finally,  the 
coefficient  on  REVCOUP  is  negative  and  significant,  indicating  that 
violent  government  changes are associated with  lower  growth,  while  the 
assassination  variable  (ASSASS)  has  the  right  sign  but  is  not 
statistically  significant. 
In  column  (2)  of  Table  2  we  replace  the  REVCOUP  and 
ASSASS  variables  with  our  measure of political  instability  (INS);  this 
is  the  average  predicted  probability  of  a  government  change.  The 
coefficient  estimate  is  negative  and  significant  at  the  1  percent 
confidence level;  after controlling  for the other determinants of growth, 
per capita growth is lower  in countries characterized by a higher degree 
of political instability.  Column  (3) shows that our measure of political 
instability  remains  significant  even  when  the  REVCOUP  variable  is 
16 included.  Similar  results  (nut  displayed  in  the  Table)  are  obtained 
when  the ASSASS  variable  is also included. 
Column  (4) of Table  2 shows  that a dummy  for  “democratic” 
regimes, DEMOCAV,  is insignificant.  Column  (5) reports our results 
using  a measure of political  instability  (MJINS)  in  which  we  consider 
only  major  changes of  government.  Thus,  the dependent variable  in 
the  probit  regression  (in  table  A.4)  used  to  obtain  MJINS  is 
MICHANGE.  This  measure  of  instability  is  also  significant. 
Furthermore,  the coefficient  is more than double  in absolute value  than 
that of the variable  INS  in column  (2).  As expected, major government 
changes have  a more  serious effect on growth. 
Column  (6) of Table  2 introduces  a variable  (PROT63)  that is 
aimed at controlling  for the orientation  of the trade regime and the level 
of  trade  distortions  (for  the  definition  of  this  variable  and  further 
discussion  of the  impact of  such variables  on growth  see Roubini  and 
Sala-i-Martin  (1991)).  Our measure of political  instability  continues to 
be  significant.  PROT63  is  defined  in  a  way  which  implies  that  a 
negative  coefftcient on this variable  indicates that more inward-oriented 
countries  grow  less.  Additional  regressions, not displayed,  show  that 
INS  remains  significant  even  when  different  measures  of  trade 
distortions  are used. 
In  summary, this  section has shown  that the degree of political 
instability,  as  proxied  by  the  probability  of  government  change 
negatively  affects  per  capita  GDP  growth.  However,  these  single- 
equation  regressions  do  not  properly  take  into  consideration  the 
17 problem  of joint  endogeneity between  growth  and political  instability. 
This  issue is examined  in the next  section. 
6.  Redts  of  the  Simultaneous  Equations  Approach 
Table  3 displays the results of the reduced form  estimation both 
for the 1950-82 and 1960-82 samples.  While  the large  sample includes 
more  information,  pre-1960  data  are  not  available  for  most  African 
countries and several Middle-Eastern  and Latin  American  countries (see 
Table  A. 1).  We report both  estimates in  order  to  emphasize  that our 
results  are robust to the sample  choice. 
Two  issues are important  to  point  out.  First,  the  correlation 
between the two  equations  is estimated significantly,  rejecting  the null 
hypothesis  that  the  shocks  to  growth  and  propensity  of  government 
change  are  uncorrelated.  This  implies  that  neither  growth  nor 
government  change  can  be  taken  as  predetermined,  and  hence 
estimation  techniques that fail  to  account for the joint  endogeneity will 
yield  biased  estimates.  Second,  the  variables  that  instrument  for 
government  change  (lagged  EXADJ  and  lagged  GCHANGE)  are 
significant  in  the  government  change  equation  but  not  in  the  growth 
equation.  Similarly  EDUC  is significant  in the growth  equation but not 
in  the  government  change equation.  These  findings  suggest that the 
variables  considered  are  reasonable  in  instrumenting  for  growth  and 
government  change. 
The  corresponding  structural  form  estimates are presented  in 
Table  4.  Inspection  of  these results  suggests the  following  findings 
concerning  the  contemporaneous  feedback  effects:  1) The  impact of 
18 political  instability  on  growth,  captured by  the  coefftcient  on 
GCHANGE  in  the  growth  equations,  is  negative.  This  result  is 
statistically  significant  at high  levels  of confidence in the  large sample, 
and  statistically  significant  at lower  levels  of  confidence  in  the small 
sample.  2)  Current  low  growth  does  not  appear  to  increase  the 
propensity  of  a government  change  as can be  seen in  the  parameter 
associated with  the GROWTH  variable  in  columns  2, and 4. 
Let  us  now  turn  to  the  other  determinants  of  growth.  The 
coefficients  on the economic variables  in  the growth  equation have  the 
expected sign  and are significant.  Our proxy  for  lagged  world  growth 
(WGROWTHl)  is  significant  and  captures  the  effect  of  a  “world 
business  cycle”.  The  level  of  education  (EDUC)  has  a  positive 
influence  on  growth.  Finally,  the  region  specific  dummy  variables 
which  are  typically  found  significant  (and  negative)  in  growth 
regressions,  Latin  America  (LATIN)  and Africa  (AFRICA),  are found 
negative  here  as well. 
The  results  for  the government  change equation  are also  quite 
sensible.  The  occurrence of executive  adjustments (EXADJ)  increases 
the  likelihood  of  a  government  change.  Furthermore,  government 
changes tend  to  be  “persistent”:  a government  change in  the  recent 
past  increases  the  likelihood  of  another  change.  This  result  is 
consistent with  the “coup  trap”  found  by Londregan  and Poole  (1990): 
a history  of frequent  coups increase the likelihood  of additional  coups. 
Government  change is less likely  in Africa.  Finally,  low  growth  in the 
recent past does not seem to  increase the probability  of  a government 
19 change.  The  coefficient  on  GROWTH(-1)  in  the government  change 
equation  is negative  but insignificant. 
The  chi-squared  test of  our  overidentifying  restriction  shows 
that in  the  large  sample  the  model  is  not rejected  at the  Sl  level  of 
significance  and in the small  sample the model  is not rejected at the .92 
level  of significance. 
Table  5  displays  the  same  two  specifications,  but  now  the 
dependent variable  is MJCHANGE,  i.e.,  “major government  changes”, 
instead  of  GCHANGE.  The  chi-squared  tests of  our  overidentifying 
restriction  do  not reject our  model  at a high  levels  of  significance  as 
indicated  the p-values  of  .88  and  .53 for  the  large  and small  samples 
respectively.  The  coefficient  of the propensity  of  I(major government 
changes” on growth  remains significant.  The  coefficient  on the effect 
of  growth  on  the propensity  to  observe  major  government  changes is 
negative,  but not statistically  significant  (though the  “t”  value  reaches - 
1.38 in  the the large  sample). 
In  contrast to the results in Table  4, the coefficient  on the Latin 
America  dummy variable  in the government  change equation is positive 
and significant.  This  is not a surprising  result once it is noted in Table 
1 that while  the frequency of GCHANGE  for Latin  America  is actually 
lower  than  in  the  industrial  and  Asian  countries,  the  frequency  of 
MICHANGE  in  Latin  America  is  the  highest  in  the  world,  almost 
double  that in  Asia  and a third  larger  than  in  the  industrial  countries. 
These  figures  highlight  how  Latin  America  is  a region  with  frequent 
major  political  changes and,  as emphasized  above,  with  low  growth. 
This  result supports the idea that what is particularly  harmful  to growth 
20 is  polarization  in  the  society  and  in  the  political  arena  leading  to 
frequent  substantial  turnovers  of political  direction. 
It  is also worth  emphasizing  how  it is likely  to be the case that 
various  events concerning  political  unrest such as government  changes, 
attempted coups and executive  adjustment are likely  to be underreported 
in  African  countries.  Note  that  Table  1 highlights  how  Africa  has 
fewer  government  changes  and  executive  adjustments  than  any other 
region  in  the  world.  Our  result  concerning  the  effect  of  political 
instability  on  growth  would  probably  be strengthened by  a correction 
of this underreporting  bias.  In fact, Africa  is a region  with  low  growth 
and an underestimated  measure of political  instability. 
7.  Sensitivity  Analysis  and  Discussion 
Our basic result that political  instability  is harmful  to growth  is 
robust to  changes in the model  specification  discussed below. 
No  significant  changes in  the  results  are found  when  we  add 
additional  lags  of  EXADJUST  and  when  we  introduce  the  variable 
ATTEMPT,  which  measures  unsuccessful  attempts  to  change  the 
government,  including  aborted  coups,  into  the  government  change 
equations.  We  also  considered  an  industrialized  country  dummy 
INDUST  for  the growth  equation. 
Specifications  that incorporate  the level  of GDP  (either GDP60 
or  GDPl,  i.e.,  lagged  level  of  GDP)  are  considered.  The  effect  of 
political  instability  on  growth  remains  statistically  significant  in  all 
21 these specifications.  However,  the chi-square statistics are much larger 
than the ones found  earlier,  leading  to  a rejection  of the model. 
The  effect of democratic  institutions  is investigated  by  adding 
the variable  DEMOC  in the growth  equation.  This  specification  of the 
model  is rejected based on chi-squared tests, and the variable  DEMOC 
is not found  statistically  significant. 
As  an  alternative  means  of  identifying  the  model  the 
contemporaneous  effects of growth  on government  changes is set equal 
to  zero  (note  from  Tables  3  and  4  that  this  parameter  is  not  found 
statistically  significant).  The  model  is not rejected, but  gives  a much 
lower  level  of significance  in  comparison  to  specifications  that do  not 
impose  this  restriction.  A  consequence  of  this  restriction  is  that 
coefficient on lagged  GDP growth  in the government  change and major 
change equations becomes significant,  indicating  that low  lagged growth 
increases the propensity  to government  changes. 
Finally,  Table  6 presents our base specification  for the  case in 
which  the dependent variable  for  government  changes is  coup  d’etat, 
as in Londregan  and Poole  (1990).  We provide  this result  as a way  of 
suggesting  where  the differences  between  the two  sets of works  might 
be arising  form. 
Unlike  that  study,  we  continue  to  find  a  negative  and  a 
statistically  significant  effect  of the  propensity  of  government  change 
(now  a coup detat) on growth.  By  focusing  only  on  coup  detat we  in 
effect reduce the primary  difference  between  these two  sets of  works 
to  model  specification  (our  general  data  base  and  econometric 
methodology  and  now  the  government  change  variable  are  almost 
22 identical).  Our  specifications  differ  from  theirs  primarily  in  that  we 
use world  growth,  education,  executive  adjustments providing  a richer 
set of predetermined  variables.  Based on a chi-squared  test we do  not 
reject the model  at .3-S  significance  levels.  (This  compares favorably 
with  Londregan  and Poole,  which  does not reject at the .l  significance 
level  .) 
An  interesting  finding  that  emerges  in  Table  6  is  that  the 
contemporaneous  growth  has  a significant  impact  on  propensity  of  a 
coup detat. This  result may indicate that when  growth  is low,  one tends 
to  observe  “substantial”  changes of  political  control  rather  than  more 
reappointments  of  incumbents.  This  of  course  needs  further 
investigation,  as not all  coup detats are substantial  if it only  involves  a 
turnover  of  generals  that  is  not  associated  with  major  political  or 
economic uncertainty  in  the country. 
8.  Concluding  Remarks 
Political  instability  reduces  growth.  This  finding  is  very 
robust:  it  has  been  obtained  in  a  model  in  which  several  other 
economic  determinants  and  “regional”  factors  affecting  growth  and 
political  stability  are accounted  for.  Democracies  do  not  appear to 
show  a different  growth  performance  than non-democracies.  Also,  the 
occurrence  of  a  government  change  increases  the  likelihood  of 
subsequent  changes,  suggesting  that  political  instability  tends  to  be 
persistent. 
Rather than reviewing  in detail  all  our results,  we  conclude  by 
highlighting  several  possible  extensions  of  this  paper.  First,  it  is 
23 worthwhile  to  continue  in  our  effort  to  distinguish  cases of  “major” 
government  changes  from  “routine”  turnovers  of  leadership  with  no 
significant changes in the ideological  orientation  of governments.  Our 
efforts  have  been, thus  far,  reasonably successful  in  the sense that the 
results  using  our  new  variable  improve,  on  some grounds,  relative  to 
those  obtained  with  the  Jodice  and  Taylor  (1983)  variable.  Further 
research  on  this  point  is  called  for.  For  instance, one  would  like  to 
address  the  following  issue:  in  certain  cases (Turkey  in  the  late 
seventies  is  a  good  example),  frequent  coalition  reshufflings  are 
indicators  of an underlying  political  unrests (which,  in fact, culminated 
in  a military  coup  in  1980).  By  disregarding  such  reshufflings,  one 
underestimates the amount of political  uncertainty.  In other cases (Italy 
in  the  post  Second War  period  is  a good  example),  minor  coalition 
reshufflings  do  not  imply  any  significant  amount  of  real  political 
uncertainty  and instability. 
Second, one  may try  to  classify  the  “ideological”  direction  of 
government  changes and test for the  effects of different  government’s 
ideology  on  economic  growth.  Such a classification  on  a  “left”  and 
“right”  scale is reasonably  easy for  a subset of countries  (for instance, 
OECD  democracies),  but much  more  problematic  for  other  countries 
where  religious,  tribal  or regional  conflicts  dominate  the polity.”  An 
even more difficult  but useful  approach would  be to attempt to measure 
the degree of  ideological  polarization  of various  parties  and groups  in 
different  countries. 
A  third  extension  would  be  to  include  measures  of  income 
distribution.  Alesina  and  Rodrik  (1991)  and  Persson  and  Tabellini 
24 (1991)  have  found  a negative  relationship  between  income  inequality 
and growth,  particularly  in  democracies.  Political  unrest  may also  be 
influenced  by inequality  while  economic development  is bound to affect 
income  distribution.  Thus,  the  three  variables,  growth,  political 
instability  and  income  distribution  are  jointly  endogenous.  The 
difficulty  in pursuing  this  extension  is mostly  due to the availability  of 
reliable  time  series data on  income distribution. 
A  fourth  direction  of  research would  be to  pursue  further  the 
analysis of democracy and growth.  As emphasized above, dictatorships 
are far from  homogeneous.  It would  be quite  interesting  to  engage in 
a disaggregate  analysis  of  which  politico-institutional  characteristic of 
dictatorships  make them more  or less growth-enhancing.  Some recent 
results  by Poole  and Londregan  (1991b)  suggest that this  may in  fact 
be a promising  avenue of research.  In a reduced form  growth  equation 
they  find  that  the  presence  of  “unconstitutional  leaders”  reduces 
growth.  Their  coding  of  “unconstitutional  leaders”  is probably  close 
to  capturing  a subset of truly  “kleptocratic”  dictators. 
A  fifth  direction  of  research is to  study a “non  linear”  pattern 
of influence  from  economic growth  to political  stability  and vice-versa. 
For  instance, Huntington  (1968) suggests that while  at relatively  a high 
level  of income political  stability  and growth  go hand  in hand, periods 
of  “take  off”,  i.e.,  of  exceptionally  high  growth,  in  middle-income 
countries  may  be  associated  with  rapid  social  transformation  and 
political  unrest.  More  generally,  the  interaction  between  political 
stability,  political  change  and  growth  may  take  different  forms  at 
different  levels  of development. 
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30 ENDNOTES 
1.  There  exists,  of  course,  a  vast 
literature  in  political  science  concerning 
this  issue.  Two  of  the  most  influential 
contributions  are  Huntington  (1968)  and 
Huntington  and  Dominguez  (1975). 
2.  Alesina,  Londregan  and  Rosenthal 
(1990)  also  address  this  problem  of  joint 
endogeneity  of  government  changes  and 
growth  for  the  U.S. 
3.  See  Rodrik  (1989)  for  a  study  of 
the  effects  of  policy  uncertainty  on 
private  investment  in  developing  countries. 
4.  Goodrich  (1992)  finds  that 
foreign  direct  investments  have  been 
negatively  affected  by  a  high  degree  of 
political  instability  in  a  large  sample  of 
LDC  countries.  Her  definition  of 
"political  instability"  is  the  same  as  that 
of  the  present  paper. 
5.  Empirical  evidence  on  the  effects 
of  political  instability  on  macro  variables 
31 such  as  seigniorage  taxation,  inflation 
rates,  budget  deficits  and  external  debt 
accumulation  is  provided  in  Cukierman, 
Edwards  and  Tabellini  (1990),  Edwards  and 
Tabellini  (1991),  dzler  and  Tabellini 
(1991),  Roubini  (1991),  Roubini  and  Sachs 
(1989a,  1989b). 
6.  This  literature  also  incorporates 
the  idea  that  the  likelihood  of  a 
government  change  has  a  larger  effect  on 
the  degree  of  uncertainty  in  the  economic 
environment,  the  higher  the  degree  of 
"political  polarization"  in  society.  The 
latter  is  defined  as  the  difference  in  the 
preferences  over  economic  outcomes  of 
different  groups  or  parties  competing  for 
office.  The  propensity  of  a  government 
change  is  not  likely  to  have  much  effect  on 
economic  decisions  if  the  next  government 
is  expected  to  follow  similar  policies  to 
the  current  one.  Thus,  the  propensity  of  a 
government  change  should  have  stronger 
32 effects  on  growth,  the  higher  is  the  level 
of  polarization. 
7.  For  instance,  Kramer  (1971),  Fair 
(1978),  Robertson  (1983),  Fiorina  (1981), 
and  Alesina,  Londregan  and  Rosenthal 
(1990). 
8.  This  "incompatibilityhypothesis" 
has  been  formulated  in  a  number  of  ways: 
see  Huntington  and  Nelson  (1976),  Kahn 
(1979)  and  Olson  (1982). 
9.  A  very  short  and  very  incomplete 
list  would  include  Amin  of  Uganda,  Bokassa 
in  the  Central  African  Republic,  the  Somoza 
and  Duvalier  dynasties  in  Nicaragua  and 
Haiti,  the  generals  of  Bolivia  and  the 
rulers  of  Guatemala. 
10.  See  Adelman  and  Morris  (1967), 
Huntington  and  Dominguez  (1975),  Marsh 
(1979). 
11.  These  studies  include  Dick 
(1974,  Goldsmith  (1987)  and  the  recent 
33 systematic  work  by  Weede  (1983)  on  a  sample 
of  94  countries. 
12.  However,  this  problem  does  not 
invalidate  the  t-statistics  for  the  null 
hypothesis  that  the  estimated  coefficient 
of  the  instability  is  zero  (Pagan  (1984)). 
13.  The  extent  of  the  time  period 
for  our  sample  is  limited  by  the 
availability  of  data  on  various  indicators 
of  political  unrest;  in  particular,  for 
almost  half  of  the  countries,  data  are 
available  from  1960  only. 
14.  We have  checked  this  variable  by 
going  back  to  original  sources  and 
corrected  coding  errors  mistakes.  This  is 
available  upon  request. 
15.  An  example  of  a  country  coded  2 
is  Mexico  where  elections  were  regularly 
held  but  with  a  one  party  rule  and  with 
widespread  allegations  of  electoral  fraud. 
In  general,  when  judgement  calls  had  to  be 
34 made  we  chose  to  be  "conservative"  in  what 
we  defined  a  "democracy". 
16.  As  expected,  political  factors 
such  as  past  government  change,  attempted 
coups  and  executive  adjustment  affect  the 
probability  of  government  change.  We  did 
not  include  lagged  growth  in  the  probit 
regressions  since  the  generated  probability 
estimate  is  used  as  an  independent  variable 
in  regressions  where  growth  is  the 
dependent  variable.  If  we  add  lagged 
growth  in  the  probit  regression,  this 
variable  is  significant  and  our  results 
improve  slightly. 
17.  See  Powel  (1982)  for  a 
discussion  of  classifications  that  consider 
class,  religious  and  ethnic  dimensions  at 
various  levels  of  development. 
35 Table  1 
Sample  Means  of the  Data:  1960-82* 
(Standard  deviations  in  parentheses) 

























































































































Countries  113  24  41  21  21  6 
Observations  2592  552  943  476  483  138 
(1960-82) 
Observations  3259  759  1051  572  693  184 
(1950-82) 
*Region  breakdowns  use  the  IMF  coding  system.  Hence,  the  “other”  category  refers  to  non- 
industrialized  European  countries. Table  2 
Cross-Section  Regressions  on  Growth 
Dependent  Variable:  Average  Per  Capita  Growth  1960-85 
(t-statistics  in parentheses) 
Explanatory 
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0.054  0.108 
(4.19)  (7.25) 
(27  (-z,” 
0.015  0.014 
(1.86)  (2.50) 
0.028  0.011 
(4.61)  (1.32) 
-0.090  -0.082 
(-3.30)  (-2.54) 
a.014  -0.008 
(-2.55)  (4.59) 
a.001  -0.014 
(-0.22)  (-2.95) 
-0.010  -0.027 
(-2.13)  (-4.12) 
-  - 
-  - 
-  -0.127 
(-2.94) 
-0.26  - 
(-2.38) 
-  -0.010 
(-4.55) 
-  - 
Sample  Size  98  98  98  98  98  59 
Adjusted  Rz  0.58  0.58  0.60  0.55  0.57  0.80 








Table  3 
Reduced  Form  of Growth  and Government  Changes: 
Specification  of Table  2 
(t-statistics  in  parentheses) 
Sample  1950-82 
Gov. 
Growth  Change 
Equation  Equation 
(1)  (2) 
0.0050  -0.583 
(0.90)  (-11.22) 
0.123  -1.262 
(6.72)  (-7.25) 
0.411  1.583 
(6.29)  (2.61) 
-0.010  -0.122 
(-3.48)  (-4.52) 
-0.011  -0.410 
(-3.52)  (-13.48) 
0.013  0.02 
(2.77)  (0.54) 
-0.001  (0.119) 
(-0.52)  (5.42) 
-0.0048  0.292 
(-1.83)  (12.49) 
RZ of growth  equation  .045 
Cases correct  for 
Government  Change  .705 
correlation  between 
shocks to  growth 
and  govt.  changes 
-.108 
(.026) 
Sample  1960-82 
Gov. 
Growth  Change 
Equation  Equation 




0.135  -1.556 
(6.W  (-8.44) 
0.525  2.126 
(6.90)  (3.15) 
-0.0099  -0.146 
(-2.79)  (-4.85) 
a.011  -0.439 
(-3.02)  (-13.79) 
0.014  xJ.0007 
(2.57)  (-0.015) 
-0.0021  0.160 
(-0.78)  (6.74) 
-0.0041  0.282 




(.029) Table  4 
Joint  Estimation  of Growth  and Government  Changes:  Base Specification 











Sample  1950-82 
Gov. 
Growth  Change 
Equation  Equation 
(1)  (2) 
-  1.720 
(0.21) 
-0.014  - 
(-2.85) 
a.003  -0.593 
(-0.43)  (-7.58) 
0.105  -1.462 
(0.77)  (-0.72) 
0.433  0.871 
(6.19)  (0.20) 
-0.012  4.103 
(4.35)  (-1.16) 
-0.017  -0.391 
(-2.75)  (-2.66) 
0.014  - 
(2.52) 
-  (0.122) 
(2.57) 
-  0.298 
(2.44) 
2  test of the  1 over- 
identifying  restriction  0.427  0.0108 
p-value  0.513 
Sample  1960-82 
Gov. 
Growth  Change 
Equation  Equation 
(3)  (4) 
-  -0.126 
(4.016) 
-0.014  - 
(-1 do) 
-0.008 
(-1 .OO)  (ZF) 
0.112  -1.538 
(0.89)  (-1.23) 
0.556  2.195 
(6.71)  (0.41) 
-0.012  -0.147 
(-3 60)  (-1.68) 
a.017 
(-2.83)  (E) 
0.014 
(2.40) 
-  0.160 
(3.29) 












Table  5 
Joint  Estimation  of Growth  and  Major  Changes:  Base Specification 
(t-statistics  in  parentheses) 
c 
Sample  1950-82  Sample  1960-82 
Major  Major 
Growth  Change  Growth  Change 
Equation  Equation  Equation  Equation 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
-  -7.624  -  -4.192 
(-1.38)  (-0.74) 
-0.00641  -  -0.0121  - 
(-2.93)  (-2.59) 
-0.0049  -1.313  -0.016  -1.340 
(4.79)  (-9.93)  (-1.90)  (-8.91) 
0.115  -0.537  0.111  -1.251 
(0.22)  (-0.041)  (0.34)  (-0.16) 
0.414  3.511  0.524  2.307 
(5.93)  (1.03)  (6.3 1)  (0.56) 
-0.0085  0.171  0.220 
(-3.10)  (2.17)  (~2y  (2.48) 
-0.011  -0.116  -0.011  -0.087 
(-0.49)  (4.19)  (-0.75)  (-0.22) 
0.012  -  0.013 
(5.04)  (4.42) 
-  (0.23 1)  -  0.244 
(3.74)  (3.79) 
-  0.173  -  0.187 
(0.35)  (0.65) 
,$  test of the  1 over- 
identifying  restriction  0.0208  0.392 










Table  6 
Joint  Estimation  of Growth  and  Coups:  Base Specification 
(t-statistics  in  parentheses) 








































2  test  of the  1 over- 
identifying  restriction  0.365  1.0337 










-0.0092  - 
(-12.69) 
a.0159  -1.718 
(-3.33)  (-9.77) 
0.115  4.005 
(0.035)  (0.037) 
0.536  22.30 
(6.45)  (3.13) 
0.189 
(1.03) 
-0.0081  -0.165 
(4.063)  (-0.033) 
0.0088 
(1.38) 
-  0.197 
(1.96) 
-  0.652 
(0.18) 
p-value  0.546  0.309 ADDendix 
Countries,  Variables  and Sources 
Table  A. 1 
Countries  and Sample  Period(+) 
Sample  1950-82 
(60  Countries) 
*  .  . 
Sample  1960-82 
(39  Countries) 
Yugoslavia* 
U.K.*  Haiti* 
Austria*  Barbados* 
Belgium*  SUrillalD 
Denmark*  Kuwait 
France*  Saudi  Arabia 
Germany*  Syria 
Italy*  Hong  Kong* 
Luxembourg*  Nepal* 
Netherlands*  Singapore* 
Norway*  Algeria* 
Sweden*  Botswana* 
Switzerland*  Burundi* 
Canada*  Cameroon* 
Japan*  Cape  Verde 
Finland*  Central  African  Republic* 
Greece*  Chad 
Iceland*  Congo 
Ireland*  Gabon* 
Portugal*  Gambia* 
spain*  Guinea-Bissau 
Turkey*  Ivory  coast* 
Australia*  Lesotho 
New Zealand*  Liberia* 
South  Africa*  Madagascar* 
Argentina*  Mali 
Bolivia*  Mauritania 
Brazil*  Mozambique 
Chile*  Niger 
Colombia*  Rwanda* 
Costa Rica*  Senegal* 
Dominican  Republic*  Sierre  Leone* 
Ecuador*  Somalia 
El  Salvador*  Swaziland* 
Guatemala*  Tanzania* 
Honduras*  Togo* 
Mexico*  Tunisia* 
Nicaragua*  Fiji* 
Panama*  Papua  New Guinea* 
0th  ** 
(14 countries) 
Malta*  (1954) 
Jamaica*  (1953) 
Israel*  (1953) 
Jordan*  (1954) 
Bangladesh*  (1959) 
Indonesia*  (1962) 
S.  Korea*  (1953) 
Malaysia*  (1955) 
Benin  (1959) 
Ghana*  (1955) 
Malawi*  (1954) 
Zimbabwe*  (1954) 
Sudan*  (1955) 





















(+)  A  *  next  to  a country  indicates  that  it  is one  of the  98 observations  of Table  2. 
The  end  of the  sample  period  is  1982 for  all  countries,  except  South  Korea  and  Hong  Kong,  for 
which  political  data  is available  only  through  1977. 
**  The  date  next to  each country  in  this  group  indicates  the  beginning  of the  sample  for  which  data 
are available. Table  A.2 
Variables  Used  in  Government  Chanm 
mendent  variables 
GCHANGE  =  Government  change.  Dummy  variable  which  takes  a value  of  1 for  the years  in  which 
there  is either  a coup or  a regular  government  transfer,  and a value  of 0 otherwise.  [Source:  Jodice  and 
Taylor  (1983)J.  We  found  several  coding  errors  in  this  variable  which  we adjusted. 
MJCHANGE  =  Major  government  change.  Dummy  variable  which  takes  a value  of  1 for the  years in 
which  there  is either  a coup or a major  regular  government  transfer,  and a value  of 0 otherwise.  [Source: 
Authors’  construction  from  Banks,  various  issues]. 
Exnlanatorv  variable 
Political  variables: 
DEMOC  =  Democracy  variable  taking  value  1 for democratic  regimes,  2 for regimes  mixing  democratic 
and  authoritarian  features,  3  for  authoritarian  regimes.  [Source:  Authors’  construction  from  Banks, 
various  issues]. 
EXADJ  =  Dummy  variable  which  takes  the  value  of  1  in  years  in  which  there  is  a  change  in  the 
composition  of the  executive  not  resulting  in  government  transfers.  [Source:  Jodice  and Taylor  (1983)]. 
ATTEMPT  =  Dummy  variable  which  takes  the  value  of  1 in  years  in  which  there  was an unsuccessful 
attempt  at changing  the  government.  Includes  failed  coups.  [Source:  Jodice  and Taylor  (1983)]. 
Economic  variables: 
GROWTH  =  Annual  rate of growth  of per capita  GDP.  [Source:  Constructed  from  Summers  and Heston 
wJ1)1. 
GDP  =  Log  of real  per  capita  GDP  level  (adjusted  for  terms  of trade).  [Source:  Summers  and Heston 
W1)l 
Regional  dummy  variables: 
LATIN  =  Dummy  variable  for  South  America  and  Latin  America. 
AFRICA  =  Dummy  variable  for  Africa. Table  A.2 
Variable  Definitions  for  Economic  Growth  Eauations 
1.  Cross section  reeressions 
Dependent  variable: 
GR6085  =  Average  annual  rate of growth  of per  capita  GDP  in  1960-1985  period.  [Source:  Summers 
and  Heston  (1988)]. 
Explanatory  variables: 
Political  variables 
INS  =  Average  probability  of government  change for  each country.  Constructed  from  the probit  model 
of government  change  shown in  A.3. 
INSMJ  =  Average  probability  of  major  government  change  for  each  country.  Constructed  from  the 
probit  model  of major  government  change  (MJCHANGE)  described  in  A.3. 
DEMOCAV  =  Country  average  of the  democracy  dummy  variable  (DEMOC);  see Table  A. 1. 
REVCOUP  =  Number  of revolutions  and coups per year  (1960-85  or  subsample).  [Source:  Barre-Wolf 
data  set]. 
ASSASS  =  Number  of assassinations  per million  population  per  year  [Source:  Barre-Wolf  data  set] 
Economic  variables: 
GDP60  =  Log  of per  capita  GDP  level  in  1960.  [Source:  Summers  and Heston  (1991)]. 
PRIM60  =  Primary  school  enrollment  rate,  1960.  [Source:  Summers  and Heston  (1991)]. 
SEC60  =  Secondary  school  enrollment  rate,  1960.  [Source:  Summers  and Heston  (1988)]. 
GOV  =  Average  of the real  government  consumption  (exclusive  of defense and education)  to Real  GDP. 
[Source:  Barre  and Wolf  data set]. 
PPI6ODEV  =  Deviation  of  the  1960  PPP  value  of  the  investment  deflator  from  the  sample  mean. 
[Source:  Barro  and Wolf  data set]. 
PROT63  =  Dummy  variable  taking  values  1,2,3,4  based upon the outward/inward  orientation  of the trade 
regime,  for  the  period  1963-73.  [Source:  World  Bank  1987  Development  Report  and  additional 
information  collected  by  Roubini  and  Sala-i-Martin  (1991). Regional  dummy  variables: 
LATIN,  AFRICA,  see above. 
II  Panel  rw 
Dependent  variable: 
GROWTH  =  AMU~  rate  of growth  of per  capita  GNP.  [Summers  and Heston  (1991)]. 
Explanatory  Variables: 
EDUC  =  Percentage  of school  age population  enrolled  in  primary  school.  [Source:  The  World  Bank]. 
Missing  years obtained  by  piecewise  linear  interpolations. 
WGROWTH  =  Weighted  average GDP  per capita  growth  for  the G-7  countries  (U.S.,  Japan,  Germany, 
France,  U.K.,  Italy,  and Canada).  The  weights  are the share of the country  GDP  in  the G-7  total  GDP. 
INDUST  =  Dummy  variable  for  industrial  countries;  takes  the  value  of  1 for  industrial  countries,  0 
otherwise. 
Other  variables  defined  above: 
DEMOC,  GROWTH(-l),  GCHANGE(-I),  LATIN,  AFRICA. 